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STUDENT NOTES
ASSAULT iN WoRKmvEN's

COMPENSATION

CASES

Of the increasing list of workmen's compensation decisions
throughout the country, numerous cases involve an assault by one
employee upon another while at work. The recent West Virginia
case of Claytor v. State CompensationComm'r' with its accompanying dissenting opinion by Judge Browning is representative of many
borderline cases which decide whether an assault upon a worker
by a fellow employee, provoked by words of the claimant, does or
does not arise from employment.
In the Claytor case, the court held that an injury received by
the decedent by being struck over the head with a shovel by a fellow-employee, which was the result of the decedent's kidding the
fellow-employee concerning the speed of his work, was purely a
personal matter between them, and not rising from the employment
was not compensable. Judge Browning's dissent sees the assault
arising from a spirit of competition between employees and would
allow recovery for the injury or death which results.
1 106 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1959).
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It is well recognized that an injury must result from employment to be compensable.2 Therefore, an assault must arise from or
because of employment, and not merely from some disconnected
personal matter.
There seem to be no definite classifications among workmen's
compensation claims growing out of assault; one court basing a
decision on one line of reasoning, while the same factual situation
in another jurisdiction might be treated in a different light entirely.
While some differences may be based on the distinctions between
the various workmen's compensation statutes, most decisions reflect
simply the various degrees of strictness or liberality upon which the
respective state courts base their decisions.
Often, in assault cases, compensation is denied because the
claimant was an aggressor. In Jackson v. State Compensation
Comm'r,3 an employee charged that another employee was impeding
his work. An altercation followed in which the decedent was the
aggressor, and as a consequence, the claim was not compensable.
Exemplary of such cases is a New York case in which the decedent
invited a coemployee to step out of his truck to settle matters, and
as he attempted to leave the truck, the decedent got in the first blow.
4
Compensation was again denied.
Although the large majority of cases deny recovery to the
aggressor, a New Hampshire case allowed recovery to one provoking
a fight, holding the defense of aggression not to be tenable. 5
Disregarding the aggressor cases, it is generally held that the
mere fact that an assault occurs while employees are at work does
not in itself mean that such injury is work-connected and compensable. In a Georgia case, a claimant was shot while sitting in
his employer's truck, but the injury was held not compensable since6
he was shot for personal reasons not connected with employment.
2 E.g., W. VA. CODE ch. 23, art. 4, § 10 (Michie 1955); Archibald v.
Workmens Compensation Comm'r, 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S.E. 791 (1916).
3 127 W. Va. 59, 31 S.E.2d 848 (1944).
4 Stillwagon v. Callan Bros., Inc., 183 App. Div. 141, 170 N.Y. Supp. 677
(1918). See also Kimbro v. Black & White Cab Co., 50 Ga. App. 143, 177
S.E. 274 (1934), where the aggressor was denied recovery even though the
assault grew out of employment. Here, bad language was held to constitute
aggression.
5 Newell v. Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947). The aggressor
defense has been abolished in other states, too. See, e.g., Petro v. Martin
Baking Co., 239 Minn. 307, 58 N.W.2d 781 (1953); Martin v. Snuffey's Steak
House, 46 N.J. Super. 425, 134 A.2d 789 (1957).
6 Jackson v. Wilson, 84 Ga. App. 684, 67 S.E.2d 161 (1951).
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The Indiana court denied compensation in a case where one
employee was continually ridiculed by the claimant. After words
between the two, the claimant was struck over the head with a
board. It was held that the matter was personal, and that the
employee reacted naturally to persistent provocation. 7 This case is
similar both factually and in the holding to the West Virginia

Ciaytor case. 8
Even in some cases where the assault has its genesis in some
work related dispute, compensation has been denied. In an Ohio case,
two employees began fighting concerning their work. One employee
threatened the other with a knife, forcing him to leave the building.
He returned a few minutes later and hit the other in the head with
a piece of pipe. Compensation was disallowed as having no causal
connection with the employment. 9
Another line of thinking is represented by the famous case of
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo.'0 Here the claimant, not
caring for the nickname "Shorty" by which he was called by a fellow
employee, responded by calling the coemployee a vile name, whereupon the claimant was hit in the face and injured. The following
words of Mr. Justice Rutledge explain his position:
"This view recognizes that work places men under strains and
fatigue from human and mechanical impacts, creating frictions which explode in myriads of ways, only some of which are
immediately relevant to their tasks. Personal animosities are
created by working together on the assembly line or in traffic.
Others initiated outside the job are magnified to the breaking
point by its compelled contacts. No worker is immune to these
pressures and impacts upon temperament. They accumulate
and explode over incidents trivial and important, personal and
official. But the explosion point is merely the culmination of
the antecedent pressures. That it is not relevant to the immediate task, involves a lapse from duty, or contains an element of
volition or illegality does not disconnect it from them nor
nullify -their causal effect in producing injurious consequences." 1
Following such a theory, almost any assault at the place of employment could be held compensable as arising from the friction and
7 Kemble v. Aluminum Co. of America, 120 Ind. App. 72, 90 N.E.2d 134
(1950).
8Note 1 supra.
9 Brown v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Ohio App. 256, 82 N.E.2d 878 (1948).

1072 App. D.C. 52, 112 F.2d 11 (1940).

11 Id. at 58, 112 F.2d at 17.
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strain of work. But the liberal view of Mr. Justice Rutledge has been
rejected by many courts, 12 and obviously has not been accepted in
West Virginia in the Claytor case.
An equally liberal view is the so-called "but-for" rule. Courts
following this theory hold that but for the employees' presence
at the place of employment, or but for the employment itself, no accident would have occurred. 13 Again, it would be difficult to deny
recovery to any injured victim of an assault following this theory.
In states not following either of the above liberal rules, a fine
line is often drawn between assaults which are held to grow
out of employment and those which do not. Itis generally held that
injuries from assaults growing out of disputes arising between employees over the manner of their work are compensable, unless
barred by aggression. A Missouri case allowed compensaton for
the death of an employee who was struck by a fellow employee in
a dispute as to whether the employees should work on Saturdays. 14
In a Minnesota dispute between two hand-truck operators, a controversy arose, with each employee claiming to be doing more than his
share of work. Compensation was allowed, it being held that an
ensuing fight and death grew out of employment. 15
The West Virginia court in the Claytor case, refusing to follow
the more liberal states, points out that some jurisdictions would
reach a contrary result, but no indication is given when, if ever, an
assault would be held to grow out of employment in West Virginia.
Undoubtedly, as long as compensation claims differ, each case will
rise and fall on its own merits, but regardless of the remoteness of
the assault to the particular employment involved, precedent can
be found in some jurisdiction to either deny or allow compensation
under any factual situation involving an assault upon a fellowemployee.
J. S.T.

12 E.g., Long v. Schultz Shoe Co., 257 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. App. 1953);
Jacquemin
v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 103 AUt. 115 (1918).
3
1 E.g., Sanders v. Jarka Corp., 1 N.J. 36, 61 A.2d 641 (1948); Anderson
dro
v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913 (1945).
14 Stephen v. Spuck Iron & Foundry Co., 858 Mo. 872, 214 S.W.2d 534
(1948).
15 Hinchuk v. Swift & Co., 149 Minn. 1, 182 N.W. 622 (1921).
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